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GORDON L. ELICKER*

Western Joint Ventures to

Carry Out Industrial Cooperation
Agreements in the Soviet Union:
Selected Problems for
United States Partiest
Introduction
Industrial cooperation agreements (ICAs) in the Soviet Union take a variety of forms, the most frequently encountered being co-production and
specialization, subcontracting, licensing, and sales of equipment and technology for entire plants. It is in this last category that it is most common to find
two or more western enterprises joining together to carry out the project.
Typically a single Western party will sign a contract, as the prime contractor,
with a Soviet foreign trade organization (FTO) to provide equipment, related
technology, advisory services regarding plant construction and the installation and erection of the equipment, training, and appropriate warranties of
the equipment and of the quality and output of the plant. The prime contractor may then, in a separate agreement, share its responsibilities, liabilities and
profits with one or more other non-Soviet companies. Generally, the FTO
will neither be a party to this latter agreement nor be bound by its provisions.
This article will examine some of the major problems which United States
parties encounter in structuring joint business undertakings of this type to
carry out an ICA which only one of the non-Soviet parties may have signed.
Though most of the comments are applicable to other types of ICAs, these
other types will not be specifically considered. In addition, this article will not
give special attention to compensation arrangements where all or a portion of

*Mr. Elicker practices law in New York City. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his partners William E. Flowers, Lucian C. Jones and Reade H. Ryan, Jr. in reviewing
portions of this article.

tAdapted from a paper presented to the Legal Committee of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and
Economic Council, Inc. at the Council's December 1978 Annual Meeting in Moscow, U.S.S.R.
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the purchase price of the plant is, in effect, paid for with output from the
plant or with other commodities, goods or services.
Joint business undertakings between otherwise independent companies are
commonly used throughout the world to carry out large industrial projects.
The principal reasons motivating a United States contractor to involve
another company in carrying out an ICA with a Soviet FTO include the
following:'
a. By combining diverse skills, know-how, technical resources or experience, two companies can often provide goods or services that neither
could provide separately. Further, the combined companies may be
able to provide goods or services more efficiently and more cheaply.
b. A United States contractor may feel that it is unable or unwilling to
assume the risks and potential liabilities inherent in a given project and
will bring in a partner to share those risks and potential liabilities.
c. United States tax laws may make it advantageous for a United States
contractor to utilize a foreign joint venture company in which it owns
fifty percent or less of the equity.
d. With the present unavailability of United States government supported
export financing from the Export-Import Bank of the United States
(Eximbank) and the limited amount of private bank financing available
in the United States on terms competitive with export financing obtainable abroad, the participation of a foreign company in the project, as a
supplier of goods or services from its home jurisdiction, may make it
possible to obtain government supported export financing or facilitate
private bank financing of those goods and services (and possibly for
other goods and services for the project) in the foreign company's home
jurisdiction. In addition, even if adequate financing were available in
the United States, it might prove advantageous for the American contractor to involve a company in a given country where local financing is
available, if the Soviet Union has credit balances in the currency of that
country which could then be utilized.

'Western companies planning to engage in projects or markets outside the Soviet Union will
frequently use joint ventures for reasons other than those listed in the text. For example, the
government of the host country where a project is to be located may require the participation of a
local partner in facilities being constructed. Tax or other advantages may be available where a
local entity participates directly in the project. Giving the foreign company a stake in the success
of the local enterprise (such as through participation in ownership or profits) is considered by
many countries to provide significant advantages over the simple purchase of facilities and
know-how. It may, for example, assure a long term relationship with the continued availability
of expertise and updating of technology. Certain Eastern European countries other than the
Soviet Union permit forms of these types of joint ventures. Also, where a company wishes to
enter and operate in a particular industry or geographic market, the risks and capital requirements to enter and operate in that market may be so high that it is not willing to undertake the
risk and investment alone and may involve a partner to share them.

Western Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union
1. Types of Joint Ventures
Joint business undertakings may take a variety of forms, all of which might
be loosely characterized as joint ventures.
Contractual arrangements between the parties which do not rise to the
status of a partnership may be considered to be joint ventures. For example, a
prime contractor subcontracting to a major supplier significant portions of
the work to be performed on an ICA might be characterized as a joint venture.
Where it is feasible to clearly allocate project responsibilities between the
co-venturers, the contract which governs the relationship of the co-venturers
as between themselves may specify the project responsibilities of each party
and allocate the compensation attributable to those responsibilities. Normally, each party will indemnify the other against liability arising out of the
performance by the first party of its project responsibilities. This type of
arrangement is referred to as a "compensation-split" joint venture, and, if
properly structured, would probably not be a partnership under the laws
governing business associations in the United States or for United States tax
purposes.
Where there is a pooling of effort and/or capital with a proportionate
sharing of profits and losses, the joint venture will normally result in the
creation of a partnership unless the parties have determined to carry out the
venture through a separate jointly-owned corporation.
Choosing the appropriate type of joint venture in United States-Soviet
trade requires consideration of essentially the same factors as in selecting
similar joint ventures elsewhere in the world. For example, the nature of the
project and each party's project responsibilities, the host country and its
laws, the methods of doing business and the corporate structure of each coventurer, the overall tax situation of each co-venturer, the forms of doing
business which are permissible and most advantageous in the various jurisdictions which might be chosen to govern the joint venture, the terms on
which required financing may be obtained, and the terms of instruments
governing indebtedness of the co-venturers, may all influence the choice of
structure in a particular joint venture.
The remainder of this article will elaborate upon some of the major problem areas encountered in joint ventures (to which the FTO is not a party) to
carry out ICAs signed by one of the co-venturers for sales of equipment and
technology for entire plants, with some illustrations of how certain of the
foregoing considerations may affect the structure of the joint venture.
1l. Financing
The type of financing which is available and the currency in which it is
available may be determinative of, or at least significantly influence, the
structure of a joint venture. At the present time, the only types of financing
available for an ICA between a United States company and a Soviet FTO are
private bank financing without government credit support (United States or
foreign) and foreign government supported export financing (normally
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available only to finance the export of goods or services from that foreign
country or to assure availability to that country of foreign sources of raw
materials).2
Currently there appears to be significant lending capacity available at
private United States banks to finance United States-Soviet trade. However,
because of limitations on United States banks lending to any one borrower,
there is considerable uncertainty as to the upper limit on credit available at
United States banks to finance this trade (in the absence of Eximbank credit
support).3 Federally chartered banks in the United States (which, in general,
are the most significant international private bank lenders in the United
States) are prohibited from lending more than ten percent of their capital and
surplus to any one borrower.' How this prohibition would be applied to
borrowing entities in Socialist countries such as the Soviet Union is unclear.
Depending on the circumstances, loans and credits to one or more (and possibly all) Soviet Union entities may have to be treated as made to a single
borrower.' In the case of Soviet FTOs, insufficient information concerning
2
Supplier (or trade) credit is not a practical financing alternative in ICAs in light of the size of
indebtedness involved and the length of term for repayment. Eximbank credit support for Soviet
ICAs is currently prohibited by statute. Trade Act of 1974, § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1976);
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, 12 U.S.C. § 635 (b) (2) (1976). Eximbank supported credit for
ICA-type projects (through direct Eximbank loans, or guarantees or insurance for commercial
bank loans) will normally not involve reliance on the credit of the United States contractor.
Consequently, if this source becomes available in the future, it will normally not affect the type
of structure a United States contractor would choose in performing an ICA with a Soviet party.
party.
Restrictions under the Johnson Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1976), and regulations under the
Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 5(b) (West Supp. 1979), should be considered
in connection with any proposed financing by United States private banks of a Soviet ICA. The
Johnson Act prohibits "persons" in the United States from making "any loan" to or purchasing
or selling "the bonds, securities, or other obligations of any foreign government. . . in default in
the payment of its obligations . . . to the United States." The Soviet Union is considered in
default under this Act. The Act's prohibition does not apply to any transaction in which the
Eximbank participates, 12 U.S.C. § 635(h) (1976), and it has been interpreted not to apply to
bank and commercial credit arrangements on normal commercial terms, if directly tied to specific export transactions. 37 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 505 (1934); 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 299 (1963); 42 Op.
ATT'Y GEN. 357 (1967). Although this interpretation of the Act, on its face, appears to remove
most barriers to arms length financing by United States banks of Soviet ICAs, the uncertainty as
to what are normal commercial terms, among other questions, means that the terms of each
proposed financing must be carefully reviewed by counsel. In addition to the Johnson Act
restrictions, the Transaction Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 505 (1978), promulgated under the Trading with the Enemy Act, may be relevant. Under these Regulations the sale or
financing of specified strategic goods in a foreign country for shipment to the Soviet Union
would require the specific authorization of the United States Department of the Treasury unless
the shipment is made from and licensed by one of the United States allies listed in the Regulations.
3
Obligations to national banking associations which are fully guaranteed both as to principal
and interest by the Eximbank are not subject to any limitation based upon the capital and surplus
of the association. 12 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1978).
412 U.S.C. § 84 (1978). Banks chartered under state law are, in general, subject to similar
restrictions.
'The criteria applied by the Comptroller of the Currency are set forth in 44 Fed. Reg. 22712
(1979) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330). In general terms, loans to foreign governments
must be combined with loans to their agencies and instrumentalities unless the borrowing entity
is sufficiently separate from the government to have separate and independent existence apart
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their respective financial conditions and operations has made it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to determine if the criteria for treatment as an
entity eligible for separate borrower status have been met in any given case.
However, even if all loans to Soviet entities are treated as made to a single
borrower, as was mentioned above, there is apparently significant lending
capacity presently available at private United States banks. If levels of trade
between the United States and the Soviet Union increase significantly in the
future and Eximbank financing continues to be unavailable, these lending
restrictions may pose a serious obstacle to United States private bank financing of this trade unless the necessary criteria can be satisfied for more than
one borrower.
Because of the availability of government supported export financing outside the United States, which will generally be provided on more favorable
terms than would be available in a United States private bank financing,
American contractors will frequently seek foreign joint venture partners or
subcontractors to provide machinery, equipment and services in connection
with a Soviet project.
If foreign government credit support is available it will normally be provided directly to a borrowing entity in the country where the project is located
or by guarantees or insurance not involving the credit of joint venture
partners. This largely eliminates the need for the lending governmental
agency to concern itself with the particular structure of the joint venture.
Nonetheless, in some instances the foreign government export financing
agency may seek to impose conditions on the structure of the joint venture or
the relationship between its national supplier and the United States contracting party in order to minimize the risk that acts of the United States party
could affect repayment of the loan or result in liability of the national supplier.
Where financing is provided by private banks (United States or foreign) it
is customary to use more complicated financial arrangements which may
cause a United States contractor to structure the joint venture in a different
manner.
Loans to Soviet FTOs are normally guaranteed by the Bank for Foreign
Trade of the U.S.S.R. (Vneshtorgbank). Because of the high credit rating of
the Vneshtorgbank, private banks are generally willing to lend to non-Soviet
contractors on a non-recourse basis (except as described below), taking as
security promissory notes of the FTO guaranteed by the Vneshtorgbank.6
from the central government and also satisfies both "means" and "purpose" tests. Briefly, the
"means" test requires the borrowing entity to "have resources or revenue of its own sufficient
over time to service its debt obligations" and the "purpose" test requires the proceeds of the loan
to be used by the borrowing entity "for a purpose consistent with the borrower's general business."
'Vneshtorgbank customarily requires that it be given a right of first refusal to purchase any
promissory note it has guaranteed prior to a proposed negotiation of the note. This requirement
limits the liquidity of the investment in these notes and detracts somewhat from their desirability
to lenders.
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These notes customarily bear interest at fixed rates. However, because
private banks are generally not willing to lend long term at fixed interest rates
which are competitive with rates provided by government supported export
financing, interest on the loan will normally be tied to the fluctuating market
rate. To the extent that the fixed rate notes of the Soviet FTO are inadequate
to cover the interest, the United States contractor or the joint venture
partners will guarantee repayment of the interest differential.
These arrangements will normally be embodied in a note purchase agreement under which the bank lenders will become holders in due course of the
notes, free of claims by others (including creditors of the joint venture
partners), and the joint venture partners will not have to treat the purchase
price of the notes as loans for purposes of financial statements or financial
covenants in loan instruments to which they are parties. However, in certain
circumstances the arrangement may be viewed as a loan secured by an assignment of the notes as collateral. Factors such as the lenders preserving specified rights of recourse against the co-venturers in case of nonpayment by the
Soviet FTO and the inclusion of financial covenants restricting the joint venture partners might indicate that the credit of the co-venturers was relied
upon and the assignment of the notes was only for collateral purposes. This
could result in the co-venturers being required to treat the arrangement as a
loan for both financial statement purposes and purposes of financial covenants in their loan instruments. It may be possible to avoid this problem
through the use of a separate corporation, not backed by credit support of the
co-venturers,' as the entity selling the Notes to the bank lenders.' Use of a
separate corporate financing vehicle would not normally require a significant
modification in the relationship between the United States contractor and
any other joint venture partners or subcontractors which might be involved in
the project.
111. Taxation
Tax considerations play a major role in determining the structure which a
joint venture will take. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the
internal corporate tax reasons a co-venturer might have for favoring a particular structure9 or the tax considerations to be taken into account in light of
the recent Soviet decree concerning taxation of income of foreign legal entities and individuals.' 0 The present discussion will be limited to the differences

'Except possibly the guarantee of the interest differential, which, if material, would probably
only have to be reflected in a footnote to the co-venturers' financial statements as a contingent
liability.
'The acceptability of this structure to lenders and (depending on the circumstances) the Soviet
FTO will, of course, have to be considered.
'See generally Glickman, Problems of the Corporation as a Joint Venturer, 35 N.Y.U. INST.
FED. TAX 581 (1977).

'Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 12, 1978 ("concerning
income tax of foreign legal entities and individuals"), Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta USSR
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in United States tax treatment of the various types of joint ventures and the
effect of the United States-Soviet Union Income Tax Treaty" on the choice
of a joint venture structure.
Under United States tax laws a joint venture (in the broad contractual sense
we have been using the term)" between two parties to perform an ICA will
normally be considered either a simple contract, a partnership, or a corporation or an association taxed as a corporation.' 3
If the joint venture is found to be a simple contract (for example, the classic
relationship between a prime contractor and a subcontractor) there would

normally be no concept of sharing the overall income relating to the project.
The determination of income to be derived by each party would not be based

on a single contractual arrangement but rather on separate arrangements
embodied in separate documents (the prime contract and subcontract). The
subcontractor's income would be determined in its subcontract without reference to the level of profit received by the prime contractor (although the

subcontractor's right to receive payment might be conditioned on receipt of
funds from the FTO). The prime contractor's income would be determined
by reference to the compensation received under the ICA less his costs (in-

cluding payments to the subcontractor).
Where a joint venture involves the sharing of profits and losses, mutual
control of the business or the active conduct of business, a partnership may
be found for tax purposes. Such a partnership has tax consequences significantly different from those joint ventures which are treated as mere contractual arrangements. For example, under joint ventures categorized as mere
contracts (or co-ownership), each co-venturer's income from the venture will

be determined separately (and not by reference to the overall income or loss
of the joint venture), certain elections (for example, methods of depreciating
assets) may be made independently by each co-venturer without requiring
that they be consistent with elections made by other co-venturers, and no

separate tax return will have to be filed as to the joint venture. In a partnership, however each partner's taxable income from the partnership will be

determined in accordance with his share of the partnership's income or loss,
(Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) 1978, No. 20, art. 313 [hereinafter cited as Tax
Decree]. The Decree is translated, described and discussed in Maguire & Stein, USSR: New
Income Tax on Foreign Legal Entities and Individuals, TAX MANAGEMENT INT'L J., Sept., 1978,
at 3.
"Convention on Matters of Taxation, June 20, 1973, United States - U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 8225 [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
'The United States Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") does not define the term "joint
venture." Code §§ 761(a) and 7701(a)(2) include a joint venture within the definition of a
partnership. Consequently, in situations where it is not desired that the joint business activity be
treated as a partnership, use of the term "joint venture" should probably be avoided.
'A fourth category of joint ventures is "co-ownership" of property. Although the line between co-ownership and partnership is not clear, the primary consideration appears to be the
degree of business activity of the co-owners or their agents. Since it is highly unlikely that a joint
venture to carry out an ICA would not involve a significant level of business activity a finding of
co-ownership is highly unlikely and will not be discussed.
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partners will be bound by certain elections made at the partnership level, and
separate partnership tax returns are required.
Where there is a foreign co-venturer, a finding that the joint venture is a
United States partnership" will probably result in the foreign co-venturer
being deemed to have a permanent establishment in the United States within
the meaning customarily given to that term under United States tax treaties.
In addition the foreign co-venturer will probably be deemed to be engaged in
United States trade or business, and might be found to have United States
taxable income computed in accordance with its share of the partnership's
income or loss. Thus, if the foreign partner wishes to avoid having United
States taxable income from the venture, the agreement governing relations
with the United States co-venturer must be carefully drawn to assure that the
arrangement is in a non-partnership contract form, such as a prime contractor-subcontractor arrangement or a compensation-split joint venture as
described earlier.
If the pass through of income and losses of the joint venture to the coventurers is an essential goal of the venture, care must be taken in structuring
the arrangements so that it is not characterized as an "association taxable as a
corporation" under the Code. When an unincorporated association has too
many of the characteristics of a corporation, the Code generally requires that
it be taxed as if it were a corporation." The criteria examined are:
1. associates;
2. an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom;
3. continuity of life;
4. centralization of management;
5. limited liability; and
6. free transferability of interests.
The first two characteristics are common to partnerships and corporations
and thus are not determinative. The United States Treasury Department has
arbitrarily taken the position that if at least three of the other four characteristics are present the arrangement will be deemed an association taxable as
a corporation. 'I By careful drafting, usually by limiting the life of the venture
and the transferability of its interests, the normal joint venture can obtain
partnership treatment.
Use of a joint venture corporation usually precludes partnership treatment. A corporation will allow the co-venturers to avoid having income and
losses of the venture reported directly by the co-venturers. At the same time,
the assets of the co-venturers can be isolated from the risks and liabilities
associated with the project, except to the extent individual guarantees by the
co-venturers may be required. It may also be possible to achieve significant
deferral of United States taxation of joint venture income by incorporating
the joint venture vehicle in a low tax foreign jurisdiction. Complex provisions
"Assuming some significant level of partnership activity in the United States.
"Treas,

Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).

'See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), (3) (1960).
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in the Code must be carefully reviewed in such cases and United States tax
authorities will probably scrutinize the structure.
However, the use of the corporate form has the disadvantage of not allowing the co-venturers as much flexibility in the treatment of joint venture
income, expenses, and the like to account for their respective tax situations as
would the non-partnership forms discussed above. In addition double taxation of at least some portion of joint venture income may result.
In structuring the joint venture, consideration must be given to applicable
tax treaties. It is my understanding that the Treaty' 7 is the only comprehensive income tax treaty in effect between the Soviet Union and a Western
country. As long as no tax treaty exists between the Soviet Union and the
country of the non-United States co-venturer it might prove advantageous to
structure the joint venture so that it could benefit from the Treaty. The absence of a treaty between the Soviet Union and the jurisdiction of the nonUnited States co-venturer may result in income of the non-United States coventurer being subject to taxation in the Soviet Union under the recent Tax
Decree. II
If the income to the joint venture were treated as income of a "resident" of
the United States it would benefit from the exemptions from Soviet taxes
provided in the Treaty. If the relationship between the United States partner
and the foreign partner were one of prime contractor-subcontractor it seems
reasonably clear that the Treaty requirements would be satisfied. If a joint
venture agreement were treated as a compensation-split joint venture and not
a partnership for United States tax purposes, it would probably not be a
separate entity for purposes of the Treaty and it seems unlikely that the foreign partner could benefit from the provisions of the Treaty. If the joint
venture were considered a partnership for United States tax purposes it would
similarly not be treated as a separate entity, but then a foreign co-venturer not
otherwise engaged in United States trade or business might be subject to the
United States income tax as described above.
IV. Antitrust
When two or more companies which compete with each other in a given
product or industry, or are capable of so competing, come together in a joint
venture, the opportunity for abuse of power is increased. Companies contemplating such a joint venture must carefully examine the purposes of their
joint activity, the effect of the joint venture on competition, the manner in
which it is carried out and the impact of these activities on participants out"Treaty, supra note II.
"Tax Decree, supra note 10. A carefully worded tax indemnity clause in the ICA can satisfactorily minimize or eliminate this risk. However, the Soviets are, in general, not accustomed to
dealing with the complicated tax concepts of countries such as the United States, which may lead
them to resist inclusion ofa sophisticated indemnity clause in the ICA. Ifan imperfect indemnity
clause is accepted, structuring the joint venture to assure availability of the Treaty exemption
becomes more important.
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side the scope of the joint venture to be sure the venture does not violate the
prohibitions of relevant United States antitrust laws or foreign competition
laws.
For the United States antitrust laws to apply to the activity of a joint
venture there must be a significant adverse impact on United States commerce. It is not necessary for the parties to be nationals or residents of the
United States or for the activities to have taken place on United States territory so long as there is an adverse impact on United States commerce. Where
two competitors join together for valid reasons (such as achieving economies
of scale, sharing risks or bringing together complementary expertise), and
only foreign competition is reduced, the joint venture is usually not challenged. Joint ventures which are limited in scope and time to a single project,
such as those to perform most ICAs with the Soviet Union, present significantly less risk of antitrust violation. Consequently, to date United States
antitrust laws have not presented special problfms in structuring joint ventures to carry out ICAs in the Soviet Union.
Areas where United States antitrust enforcement authorities are most
likely to scrutinize joint ventures for industrial cooperation with the Soviet
Union are as follows:
1. The joint venture might present the opportunity to exchange information about matters outside the scope of the joint venture (for example,
pricing policies in other markets or for other goods and services) which
could be viewed as a conspiracy to restrain trade;
2. Joint selling abroad might be viewed as restraining independent export
competition out of the United States; however, if the joint selling produced no adverse effect on United States consumers or competitors, it is
unlikely to be challenged;
3. ICAs may involve counterpurchase arrangements. These arrangements
might be viewed as joint buying arrangements and would have to be
evaluated separately under the antitrust laws. Generally such arrangements will not be challenged if they are not designed to encourage
higher prices for the goods purchased and there are no agreements relating to domestic United States competition or to pass on price increases;
and
4. Resale and re-export limitations in licensing or distributorship arrangements must be reviewed carefully; however, it is unlikely that such considerations will affect the structure of the joint venture.
In summary, if there are legitimate reasons for two or more companies to
jointly undertake a project for industrial cooperation of limited scope and
duration, it is unlikely that United States antitrust laws will be a major consideration in determining the structure of the joint venture, although individual contract terms-both in the joint venture agreements and the agreements
with the Soviet FTO - will have to be reviewed carefully.
The co-venturers should endeavor to isolate the joint venture from other
areas of their respective activities. This may be done by creating a separate
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entity with a separate staff or by at least endeavoring to assure that representatives of the companies in the joint venture do not have additional responsibilities in areas where the companies may compete with each other. Meetings
and discussions of joint venture activities by the co-venturers should never
extend outside the scope of the joint venture to areas where competition exists
between the companies.
V. Relative Liability of Co-Venturers
The joint venture agreement will normally attempt to specify the liability
of each party to the other. These provisions will deal with both the liability
which the joint venturers may incur to the FTO and other Soviet parties, as
well as the potential liabilities between the co-venturers independent of any
obligation to the FTO or other Soviet party. Normally these provisions provide that any liability arising out of the performance by one co-venturer
under the ICA shall be the sole responsibility of that co-venturer, who must
then indemnify the other co-venturer against any resulting liability. Where it
is difficult or impossible to allocate responsibility for performance of certain
portions of the ICA to one of the co-venturers (for example, responsibility
for production or quality guarantees where both parties have contributed
know-how to the various steps of a complex production process), they may
agree on a formula for sharing the liability. 9 If the structure of a joint venture is such that there is a general sharing of profits and losses, cross indemnity provisions might be inappropriate, at least in the absence of fault by a
given co-venturer.
Vl. Dispute Settlement
Disputes between the co-venturers which cannot be resolved amicably will
normally be settled by arbitration, and a specific clause to that effect will
appear in the joint venture agreement. American co-venturers will most frequently choose the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and frequently the specialized Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of that
body, as the rules which will govern their arbitration. Similarly, where the
joint venture is between a United States company and a foreign company,
disputes will customarily be settled by arbitration. However, the choice of
rules which will govern the arbitration will vary significantly from one joint
venture to another, depending on the nationality of the participants, the
matters which might be the subject of the arbitration, the law which governs
the joint venture agreement, and a variety of other considerations.
If the law governing the ICA is the law of a neutral jurisdiction, such as
Sweden, and arbitration under the ICA is to take place there,20 it is sometimes
'Note that the sharing of liability in question here is only as between the parties under the joint
venture agreement. The liability to the FTO will be determined principally by the ICA to which,
in all probability, only one of the co-venturers will be a party.
2
Under the model arbitration clause Optional Arbitration Clause for Use in Contracts in
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suggested that the law of the neutral jurisdiction should also govern the joint
venture agreement, and any arbitration should be conducted by the same
neutral body under the same rules as for the ICA. Disputes under the respective contracts could then be consolidated. Although this suggestion might, on
first impression, have some appeal it would not seem to be a desirable approach from the viewpoint of either joint venturer.
The issue in the arbitral proceedings under the ICA will be the liability of
the non-Soviet signatory of the ICA to the FTO. The FTO is not concerned
with the relative liability of the joint venturers between themselves and that
issue should not complicate the proceeding. In addition, the joint venture
partners will undoubtedly prefer not to involve the FTO in the resolution of
their internal dispute. As a result, a consolidation of the two proceedings
would be inappropriate. Although certain factual issues may be essentially
the same in both proceedings, there is no logical need to apply the same laws
to both agreements. The issue of the sharing of liability to the FTO will be
resolved by the manner in which responsibilities and liabilities are divided
under the terms of the joint venture agreement. Although the joint venture
agreement may refer to clauses of the ICA describing joint venture responsibilities (thereby possibly involving the law governing the ICA to interpret its
terms), any advantage in using the same law to govern the joint venture
agreement would seem clearly outweighed by the advantages of lower cost,
convenience and familiarity if arbitration is conducted in the home jurisdiction of one of the co-venturers and under its laws.
If both joint venture partners are United States companies, a United States
arbitration under the laws of some United States jurisdiction is preferable in
terms of both convenience and familiarity with the law. Where an American
and a foreign party are joint venture partners, it would seem preferable to
have the laws of one of their home jurisdictions apply to the resolution of
disputes under the joint venture agreement, unless it is felt that the chosen law
would not apply in a neutral manner to both parties or it would be difficult
for one party to be adequately and conveniently apprised of the law (for
example, language or legal concepts not widely used in international commerce). If there is a predominant party in the joint venture, it will normally be
the laws of its jurisdiction which will govern the transaction, with the arbitration being held in that jurisdiction, although it is sometimes proposed that the
place of arbitration should be the country of the defendant in the arbitration.
This latter approach has a tendency to deter parties from commencing arbitration proceedings since they would be arbitrating in the other party's home
territory. Thus it may result in disputes going unresolved for long periods of
time with the parties delaying performance, parrying to see who will bring the
arbitration. Completion of the project will frequently suffer in such circumstances.
USA-USSR Trade-1977 (prepared by the American Arbitration Association and the USSR
Chamber of Commerce and Industry), arbitration would take place in Stockholm, Sweden
under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
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VII. Currency Risks
Where goods and services in connection with an ICA are provided by companies from more than one country, the currencies of at least two countries
will normally be required to pay for those goods and services. If the ICA is
denominated in a single currency, fluctuations in the exchange rate between
that currency and the other currency in which costs are being incurred can
result in gains or losses which will be difficult to predict, impossible to control, and, practically speaking, impossible to hedge against. Consequently,
contractors will normally seek to have the ICA denominated in the currencies
required, so that the price quoted to the FTO for performance of the ICA will
not have to include a factor based on a speculative estimate of the impact of
currency fluctuations. Of necessity, the foreign contractor will estimate this
impact conservatively, possibly increasing significantly the quoted contract
price.
The elimination of this factor from price discussions should work to the
benefit of the FTO and the Soviet Union. The pricing discussions can then
focus more clearly on the value of goods and services to be provided. To the
extent conversion to a given currency is necessary to evaluate competing bids,
a more accurate assessment will be made if Soviet authorities make that conversion themselves in light of anticipated foreign currency needs for the
whole country, available foreign currency balances, and a consistently applied evaluation of future movements in currency markets, rather than relying on conservative evaluations of foreign contractors in multicurrency projects. Notwithstanding the merits of this reasoning from the Soviet
viewpoint, FTOs are generally reluctant to consider denominating individual
ICAs in more than one currency.
VIII. Interface of Soviet Planned Economy and
American Market Economy
A major problem area which must be faced in every ICA between a United
States company and a Soviet FTO is the interface of the Soviet planned
economy and the American market economy. For budgeting purposes under
the economic plans developed by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan)
the FTO feels it must have a fixed total price for completion of a contract."
This necessity affects several aspects of the ICA negotiations.
To assure that financing costs can be known at the outset, FTOs will normally insist upon fixed interest rates in any financing provided. Although
fixed interest rates can normally be obtained from government subsidized
export financing institutions, it is extremely difficult to find medium to long

2
Normally FTOs will not insist that fixed prices be quoted for spare parts to be supplied in the
future. In addition, escalation based on economic indices is sometimes accepted, subject, nonetheless, to an overall ceiling. Cf. Hoya & Stein, Drafting Contracts in U.S.-Soviet Trade, 7
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 293 (1975).
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term private financing except at interest rates which fluctuate with current
market conditions over the life of the loan. As was indicated earlier, if the
contractor is required to take the risk of a difference between the fixed rate
the FTO is willing to pay and the floating rate at which private banks are
willing to lend, he must conservatively estimate the dollar amount of that risk
and add it to his contract price.
If, in fact, the interest rates do not fluctuate in as adverse a manner as the
contractor estimated, the FTO will end up paying more for goods and services than if it had assumed that risk itself. From the Soviet party's viewpoint,
it would have been preferable to eliminate from its discussion with the United
States contractor the question of evaluating the risk of this interest differential. The United States contractor will normally be happy to eliminate this
issue from the negotiations since it will enable him to avoid estimating an
amount which is both speculative and with respect to which he may have little
expertise. Consequently this amount must be estimated very conservatively.
The Vneshtorgbank could make such an estimate and it might be possible for
the FTO to budget an amount to account for possible interest rate fluctuations. Any savings resulting from interest rates not reaching the conservatively estimated levels would accrue to the benefit of the FTO instead of
being lost to the foreign contractor.
The desire to have fixed price contracts creates difficulties for the United
States contractor in other areas. In a complex project the full scope of work
will frequently not be known at the time the contract is signed. It will be
known only when all engineering work has been completed and, in general,
most American engineering firms are not willing to complete a substantial
amount of the engineering prior to execution of the contract. Consequently,
if a United States contractor is to provide a fixed quotation on all elements of
the project before signature, it will have to conservatively estimate costs
which would be shown by completed engineering work.
The problem of estimating costs is not limited to the engineering area. In
the United States, particularly in an inflationary period, it can be extremely
difficult to negotiate fixed price subcontracts for work on projects. Even
where it has been possible to negotiate fixed price subcontracts, it is possible
that the prime contractor may nonetheless have to pay escalation under those
contracts. For example, if a shortage of supply develops, the subcontractor
may be in a very strong negotiating position to obtain a price increase
notwithstanding a fixed price contract. Without regard to a shortage of supply, if the subcontractor's costs have risen he may still be in a position to
negotiate a price increase. The alternative to agreeing to a price increase may
be to terminate the contract, sue for damages and find a replacement contractor, probably at an increased cost. Although the increased cost might be
recovered from the old subcontractor, there would likely be significant delays
in completion of work and possibly less warranty protection than would have
been obtained from the original subcontractor. Consequently, the prime contractor may feel that it is preferable to agree to escalation with the original
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subcontractor in order to insure timely performance under the ICA with
adequate guarantees. Because of this risk, the prime contractor must add to
his estimate of costs under the ICA an amount designed to protect him
against such possible escalation. The supplemental amount may, in fact, turn
out to be unnecessary; however, the prime contractor will normally be unwilling to take this risk. The result may be that the FTO pays an excess amount
which could have been avoided by allowing escalation or utilizing "cost-plusfee" type contracts.
The considerations affecting relations between a prime contractor and its
subcontractors outlined above apply with equal force to relations between
the prime contractor and the owner. Fixed price contracts will not guarantee
that the owner will be provided with a satisfactory facility, on time, and at a
fixed cost. Most of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa can
attest to the truth of this statement.
In the Middle East and North Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s it was
fairly customary to enter into fixed price construction contracts. Frequently,
too great an emphasis was placed on the overall price and not enough attention was given to the reputation and abilities of the prime contractor (many of
the major construction and engineering firms were unwilling to contract on
anything but a "cost-plus-fee" basis). With the high rates of inflation in the
early 1970s, many of these projects were delayed because of the contractors'
unwillingness to incur expenses without obtaining agreed price increases
from the purchasers.
In other cases goods of lower quality were used with the hope of remaining
within budget. Frequently the owners were forced to agree to repeated price
increases (largely converting the contract to a "cost-plus-fee" arrangement),
to fire the prime contractor and seek a replacement contractor, or to accept a
plant of lesser quality. When replacement contractors were found, they were
unwilling to complete the projects on anything other than a cost-plus-fee
basis and they were unwilling to provide meaningful guarantees of quality
and production. Many of the former contractors had become insolvent or
bankrupt due to their financial difficulties (arising to a significant extent
from such contracts) and recovery of actual damages from them, even if they
were found liable, was unlikely. Many of these problems might have been
avoided by giving greater emphasis to the reputation and capabilities of contractors and being more flexible on the basis of compensation. If budgeting
problems for Soviet FTOs could be satisfactorily dealt with, use of more
flexible compensation arrangements in ICAs might give greater assurance of
timely completion of projects with high quality materials and workmanship
at a reasonable cost.
In summary, Soviet FTOs and American companies have found and will
continue to find satisfactory means of interfacing the two economic systems.
The emphasis on fixed price contracts by Soviet FTOs has unquestionably
resulted in higher costs for the goods and services purchased. If greater flexibility could be built into the FTO's budgeting requirements a considerable
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savings to the Soviet Union could result and speculative elements in contract
negotiations, which neither party has adequate control over or ability to
predict, could be eliminated. Consideration might be given, for example, to
treating these elements as insurable risks for which the FTO could pay an
agreed premium to a central insurance body which would bear the risk in a
manner similar to that done for other types of insurance in the Soviet Union.
Additional alternatives consistent with the requirements of Soviet law and
the Gosplan may also suggest themselves.

